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Prime Minister Narendra Modi became the first Indian 
prime minister to visit the region in 33 years. In May 
2017, the India–Pacific Islands Sustainable Development 
Conference was inaugurated in India and the Indian 
government pledged to set up centres of excellence 
in information technology (IT) in Cook Islands, Fiji, 
Nauru, Niue and Samoa (India MEA 2017).
The growing presence of external players, China 
in particular, has bred anxieties among traditional 
regional powers, notably Australia and New Zealand, 
and forced them to devote more attention to the region. 
For example, the Australian Government increased 
their support (totalling over AU$100 million) for 
PNG to host the APEC summit (ABC 1/2/2017). It 
also blocked Chinese company Huawei’s plan to lay 
an undersea internet cable between Australia and the 
Solomon Islands and instead provided nearly AU$137 
million to lay a cable between Australia, PNG and the 
Solomon Islands (ABC 11/7/2018). In his address at 
the Lowy Institute in Sydney in March, Winston Peters, 
New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister and Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, said the Pacific is ‘attracting an 
increasing number of external actors and interests … 
This is creating a degree of strategic anxiety’ and New 
Zealand would respond by increasing its aid to the 
region (Lowy Institute 2018c). 
China’s rise in the Pacific has also led to greater 
US attention on the region. The Pacific was part of 
President Obama’s rebalance strategy and forms part 
of President Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy. In 2012, 
Hillary Clinton became the first US Secretary of 
State to attend the Pacific Islands Forum Post-Forum 
Dialogue in the Cook Islands. While noting ‘The 
Pacific is big enough for all of us’, she declared that 
‘The 21st century will be America’s Pacific century, 
Introduction
China is increasing its presence in the Pacific region. 
In Papua New Guinea (PNG) as an example, Prime 
Minister Peter O’Neill visited Beijing in June 2018, his 
sixth trip in an official capacity since 2012. During 
this latest trip, he signed up to China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative, making PNG the first and only country in 
the Pacific to join this initiative1 to date (China MFA 
2018). In July 2016, O’Neill and Chinese leaders agreed 
in Beijing to integrate PNG’s Development Strategic 
Plan 2010–2030 with China’s 13th Five-Year Plan and 
Belt and Road Initiative (China MFA 2016). China 
also funded the construction of the International 
Convention Centre in Port Moresby, which is China’s 
largest grant aid project in the Pacific to date and will 
be used as the main venue for the 2018 APEC summit 
in November.
Japan has a long history of engagement with Pacific 
island countries (PICs) and is maintaining its presence. 
In May 2015, Japan hosted the seventh Pacific Islands 
Leaders Meeting in Fukushima and pledged to provide 
a minimum of US$515.8 million (55 billion yen)2 in 
aid to PICs over the next three years (Japan MOFA 
2015a). It fulfilled this aid pledge and committed 
the same amount at the eighth summit in May 2018 
(Japan MOFA 2018). Japan also donated 46 buses, 22 
ambulances and musical instruments to PNG for use 
during the APEC summit. Under a loan project worth 
US$77.5 million (8.2 billion yen), Japan and PNG 
also aim to complete the upgrading of Port Moresby’s 
sewerage system before the APEC meeting and have 
it opened by the Japanese prime minister during the 
summit (Vari 7/2/2018). 
India is another Asian power that is becoming 
increasingly active in the Pacific. In November 2014, 
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with an emphasis on the Pacific’ and the United States 
will stay ‘for a long haul’ (Clinton 2012). She pledged 
an aid package of US$32 million on top of America’s 
annual aid of US$330 million to the region (Larsen 
2012), which stands in stark contrast to America’s aid 
cut in the previous two decades. USAID also opened 
its office in PNG in 2011 and provided US$100 
million in military aid to the region (ibid.). These 
activities echoed the remarks of Secretary Clinton 
before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
in 2011: ‘We are in a competition for influence with 
China’ (Pennington 2/3/2011). More recently, the US 
National Security Strategy stated bluntly, ‘A geopolitical 
competition between free and repressive visions of 
world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region 
… China presents its ambitions as mutually beneficial, 
but Chinese dominance risks diminishing the 
sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific’ (White 
House 2017:45–46). 
Although the activities of China, Japan and India in 
the Pacific have attracted growing academic attention, 
the existing literature is patchy at best. The two books 
of the late Professor Ron Crocombe, The South Pacific 
(2001) and Asia in the Pacific Islands (2007), are a 
good starting place, covering China, Japan and India’s 
engagement with PICs until about 2006. Existing 
literature also covers China–Taiwan rivalry, PICs in 
China’s grand strategy, the United States’s response to 
China’s rise and Chinese investors’ practices in different 
sectors (Brady 2010; Firth 2013; Smith 2013; Wesley-
Smith 2013; Yang 2011). The evolution of Japan’s aid 
policy in the South Pacific is investigated by Sandra 
Tarte (2008) while India’s inroads into the southern 
Pacific are canvassed by David Scott (2007). Saloni 
Salil argues that India has no strategic ambitions in the 
South Pacific and can cooperate with China (2014). 
Further academic attention is warranted, given the 
ever-changing geopolitical atmosphere in the Pacific.
Why focus on China, Japan and India? The 
engagement of the three countries, the world’s second, 
third and sixth largest economies, with PICs could 
have significant impact on the region. All three have 
been active in the Pacific in the past decade — activity 
which is inadequately discussed in the literature. 
Asian diplomacy in the Pacific, in particular, is under-
explored when compared with that in Asia itself, 
Africa and Latin America, and scholarly works have 
mainly focused on China in the Pacific and paid less 
attention to Japan and India. China, Japan and India are 
competitors in many respects. Whether and how they 
compete in the Pacific deserves more research. 
Three questions will be examined in this paper: 
1) what are the latest engagements of China, Japan 
and India with the Pacific region? 2) What are their 
motives? 3) How have they impacted the region? The 
time frame of this research is between 2006 and 2017,3 
a period that witnessed substantial engagement of the 
three countries with the region, but with these new 
developments being inadequately captured by the 
literature. The analysis covers all 14 PICs. It builds 
upon the author’s 16 years work and research in the 
region and more than 120 interviews with government 
officials, diplomats, scholars, company representatives, 
media and civil societies during his doctoral research. 
The paper also refers to an extensive review of scholarly 
works and public government reports. 
Part 1. Latest developments
Political engagement
High-level visits and the presence of embassies in 
the Pacific are in this paper taken to be indicators 
for the intensity of political engagement with PICs 
by China, Japan and India. Figure 1 below provides 
the total number of ministerial level (or above) two-
way visits between the three Asian powers and PNG, 
Fiji, Vanuatu, Tonga, Samoa, the Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM), Cook Islands and Niue. While Japan 
and India have diplomatic relations with all 14 PICs, 
China is only recognised by the above eight Pacific 
states (hereafter referred to as ‘the eight Pacific partner 
states of China’). 
Clearly, most interactions have involved China. 
The number of Chinese high-level visits to the Pacific 
between 2006 and 2016 is more than twice the number 
of visits from Japan and India combined. China was 
also a more popular destination for Pacific leaders and 
ministers during this period than Japan and India. The 
larger number of high-level visits between China and 
PICs provides evidence of China’s growing engagement 
with the region.
Particular high-level visits and bilateral 
mechanisms symbolise the growing attention China, 
Japan and India place on the Pacific and therefore 
they warrant a special mention. One of these occurred 
in April 2006 when Premier Wen Jiabao visited Fiji, 
the first Chinese premier in history to do so, and 
inaugurated the China–Pacific Economic Development 
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and Cooperation Forum. This forum was designed to 
be a framework for China to promote relations with the 
region, and shortly afterwards its was hailed as a great 
success in Chinese media. Eight years later, the trip of 
Xi Jinping to Fiji in November 2014 was the first visit 
by a Chinese president to the region. Xi and leaders 
from the eight Pacific partner states agreed to elevate 
their relations to a ‘strategic partnership’.5 This term, 
which is used vaguely in China’s diplomatic parlance 
(Zhang 2017), is a telling sign of China’s growing 
attention to the Pacific.
Japan has also put greater efforts into its bilateral 
relations with PICs. In 1997, a triennial Pacific Islands 
Leaders Meeting (PALM) was established by Japan as 
a platform for the Japanese prime minister and Pacific 
leaders to discuss bilateral cooperation. Four PALM 
meetings were hosted by Japan between 2006 and 2017, 
and substantial development assistance was pledged to 
the Pacific, which will be discussed later in this paper. In 
2010, Japan started to host ministerial interim meetings 
with PICs to assess the follow-up of PALM outcomes. 
India’s admission as a Dialogue Partner of the 
Pacific Islands Forum, the most important regional 
organisation, occurred in August 2002, over a decade 
later than Japan’s (1989) and China’s (1990). Similarly to 
China and Japan, India set up a framework mechanism 
to promote cooperation with PICs. During his visit to 
Fiji in November 2014, Prime Minister Modi established 
the forum for India–Pacific Islands Cooperation. The 
second meeting was held in India’s city of Jaipur in 
August 2015. India’s engagement with PNG, the 
largest PIC both by population and land area, 
has also grown. In July 2009, PNG’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Samuel Abal visited India, which 
was the first ministerial visit from PNG to India. 
President Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to PNG in 
April 2016 was also the first state visit in history 
to PNG by an Indian head of state. 
In terms of resident embassies, China has set 
up embassies in six of the eight Pacific partner 
states: Fiji, FSM, PNG, Samoa, Tonga and 
Vanuatu. This arrangement provides Chinese 
diplomats with the advantage of maintaining 
close contact with the governments of these PICs 
and swiftly reporting first-hand information on 
bilateral relations back to Beijing. The Chinese 
embassy in Wellington looks after China’s 
relations with Cook Islands and Niue, two Pacific 
states that are in free association with New 
Zealand. Niue, in December 2007, was the latest Pacific 
state to establish diplomatic relations with China. In the 
past decade, China slightly increased the number of its 
diplomats in PNG and Tonga. Each Chinese embassy 
designates one to two officials to oversee the provision 
of China’s fast growing in-country aid under the 
economic and commercial counsellor’s office.6
In terms of the number of embassies, Japan with 
nine embassies in the region has a stronger presence 
in the Pacific than China. While the embassy in Fiji 
provides services for another three PICs (Kiribati, 
Nauru and Tuvalu), Japan has set up an embassy 
in each of the following six PICs: FSM, Republic of 
Marshall Islands (RMI), PNG, Palau, Samoa and 
Solomon Islands. In June 2011 and August 2015, Japan 
entered into diplomatic relations with Cook Islands 
and Niue. Similar to China, the embassy of Japan in 
New Zealand manages Japan’s relations with Cook 
Islands and Niue. To lift its cooperation with Tonga 
and Vanuatu and better manage its growing aid, Japan 
opened its embassies in the two PICs in early 2009 and 
2018 respectively. Japan dispatched its first ambassador 
to Palau in February 2010, though the embassy was 
opened in 1999. 
Compared with China and Japan, India’s diplomatic 
presence in the Pacific is limited. It has only opened 
resident diplomatic missions in PNG and Fiji, India’s 
principal diplomatic and trading partners in the 
region. India’s bilateral relations with the other 12 
PICs (as shown in parentheses) are managed remotely 
Figure 1: High-level visits between China, Japan, India and PICs, 2006–16 
Source: compiled by author from online sources.4
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm4                                                                                                                             Department of Pacific Affairs
Denghua Zhang
by its diplomatic missions elsewhere: Indian high 
commission in PNG (Solomon Islands), Indian high 
commission in Fiji (Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, Tuvalu 
and Vanuatu); Indian embassy in Japan (RMI); Indian 
embassy in the Philippines (FSM and Palau); Indian 
high commission in New Zealand (Cook Islands, Niue 
and Samoa). 
Similarly, PICs have a higher number of embassies 
in China and Japan than India. Except Cook Islands 
and Niue, all eight PICs in diplomatic relations with 
China have opened embassies in Beijing. Among them, 
the most recent are FSM and Samoa, which established 
diplomatic missions in China in April 2007 and June 
2009 respectively. Regarding Japan, seven PICs have 
resident diplomatic missions in Tokyo: Fiji, FSM, 
RMI, Palau, PNG, Samoa and Tonga. In July 2009, 
Samoa’s first ambassador to Japan arrived in Tokyo. 
Tania Tupou, deputy private secretary to the King of 
Tonga, became the country’s first ambassador to Japan 
since October 2012. In stark contrast, Fiji and PNG 
are the only two among the 14 PICs that have resident 
diplomatic missions in India. They were opened in 
January 2004 and October 2006 respectively. 
Trade
In the trading landscapes of China, Japan and India, 
the role played by PICs economic activities is minor. 
For example, in 2016, China’s 
export to and import from 
the 14 PICs reached US$5.39 
billion and US$2.1 billion 
respectively, accounting for 
merely 0.23 per cent and 0.13 
per cent of China’s export and 
import globally (Pacific Trade 
and Investment 2017). 
Conversely, China and 
Japan have become principal 
merchandise trading partners 
of 10 PICs. As Table 1 
illustrates, in 2016 Japan was 
PNG’s third largest export 
destination next to Singapore 
and Australia, accounting for 
12.6 per cent of PNG’s total 
export. China was PNG’s fourth 
largest export market (11.4 per 
cent) and second largest import 
source (14.9 per cent).
It is important to note that 
RMI is China’s largest export 
destination in the Pacific. 
The Pacific Islands Trade & 
Investment Office in China, an 
agency of the Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat, estimates 
that China’s exports to RMI 
exceeded US$3.97 billion in 
2016, equivalent to 73.7 per 
cent of China’s export to the 
14 PICs combined (2017).7 As 
the RMI ship registry is one of 
the world’s largest,8 its demand 
Table 1. China and Japan as principal trading partners of PICs
PIC Year Principal export destinations Principal import sources
Country Rank Percentage 
(%)
Country Rank Percentage 
(%)
Cook 
Islands
2015 Japan
China
Australia
New Zealand
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
51.1
20.5
7.6
4.2
New Zealand
Australia
1st
3rd
61.4
2.5
Fiji 2016 Australia
New Zealand
China
2nd
3rd
4th
15.0
7.0
5.1
New Zealand
Australia
China
1st
2nd
4th
17.4
17.4
15.3
Kiribati 2015 NA China
Japan
Australia
2nd
3rd
4th
23.5
16.0
10.6
Nauru 2016 Australia
Japan
2nd
3rd
13.6
12.9
Australia
Japan
China
1st
3rd
4th
70.9
4.3
3.4
Palau 2016 NA Japan
Australia
2nd
4th
13.0
1.1
PNG 2016 Australia
Japan
China
2nd
3rd
4th
21.9
12.6
11.4
Australia
China
1st
2nd
35.9
14.9
Samoa 2016 Australia
New Zealand
1st
3rd
35.9
12.0
New Zealand
China
Australia
1st
3rd
5th
23.9
14.1
10.3
Solomon 
Islands
2016 China 1st 62.5 Australia
China
1st
3rd
20.4
14.8
Tonga 2015 China
Australia
1st
7th
16.0
7.5
New Zealand
China
Australia
2nd
3rd
5th
21.2
14.2
4.5
Vanuatu 2016 Australia
Japan
1st
4th
16.9
10
Australia
New Zealand
China
1st
2nd
3rd
28
17.7
10.6
Note: To provide some context, Australia and New Zealand as main regional powers are included 
in the table.
Source: compiled by author using data from Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
The Pacific.
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for ships and boats has grown steadily. Since 2009, 
China’s exports to RMI have increased substantially. The 
majority are related to ships, some of which are then 
exported to other countries including Germany, Poland, 
Thailand and Greece (Pang and Ye 2015). In 2016, 
China exported US$3.66 billion worth of ships, boats 
and floating structures to RMI, which accounts for 92 
per cent of China’s export to the country (Pacific Trade 
and Investment 2017).9 This matches the finding of the 
World Bank which recorded US$3.95 billion in China’s 
merchandise export to RMI in 2016, of which US$3.64 
billion or 92.2 per cent were transportation products.10
Figure 2 below summarises the trajectory of 
bilateral merchandise trade between China, Japan, 
India and the 14 PICs. China’s trade with these Pacific 
states had grown steadily between 2007 and 2016 
except for a slight decrease in 2012 and 2013. The 
bilateral trade in 2016 exceeded US$7.3 billion, nearly 
five times that in 2007.11 Compared with China, Japan’s 
trade with the PICs experienced slower growth in this 
period though the volume in 2016 doubled on the 
base of 2007. Since 2009 (except for 2010), China has 
overtaken Japan as a more important trading partner of 
the region. India lags considerably behind China and 
Japan in terms of trade with the Pacific. Commodity 
trade between India and the 14 PICs was US$274 
million in 2016, equivalent to 3.7 per cent of China’s 
trade with the region and 6.7 per cent of Japan–PICs 
trade. Compared with China and Japan, India’s trade 
with the region experienced more fluctuations in the 
decade of 2007–16. India–PICs trade in 2016 was 
almost of the same level of the trade in 2007.
Aid
Aid plays a prominent role in the diplomacy of China, 
Japan and India in the Pacific. It is instrumental to 
their pursuit of national interests, including as a vehicle 
for demonstrating their responsibilities as global 
powers. Foreign aid also facilitates the penetration 
of private investment from these countries into the 
Pacific. Although the Pacific is not a priority in the 
aid strategies of China, India and Japan, the impact 
of changes to aid is readily felt by PICs. Before 
proceeding, it is important to note that access to 
data on the aid disbursements of China and India is 
difficult. Accordingly, some discussions below use aid 
commitments rather than actual disbursements.13 
Japan has demonstrated more aid transparency 
than China and India. China does not publish yearly 
country-based data on its aid spending, which could 
largely be explained by its intention to reduce domestic 
discontent with China’s aid program as, according to 
its own official estimates, 55 million Chinese citizens 
still live in poverty.14 Similarly, data released by the 
Indian government on its aid program is limited. 
By contrast, Japan’s annual Official Development 
Figure 2: China/Japan/India–PICs bilateral trade in 2007–16, USD million.
Source: compiled by author based on World Bank data.12
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Assistance (ODA) white paper provides a breakdown 
of its aid programs by country. In terms of aid volume, 
according to China’s two white papers on its foreign 
aid, China provided US$1.62 billion (RMB 10.25 
billion) in aid to the Pacific region in the period 1950–
2009 and US$592.4 million (RMB 3.75 billion) between 
2010 and 2012, which represents 4 per cent and 4.2 
per cent of Chinese overall aid spending in the two 
periods respectively (China State Council 22/4/2011, 
11/7/2014). Based on the foreign aid map in the Pacific 
region released by the Lowy Institute in August 2018, 
the cumulative Chinese aid spent in the region reached 
US$1.26 billion from 2011 onwards, which ranks China 
the second largest donor behind Australia (US$6.58 
billion) and ahead of New Zealand (third largest, 
US$1.21 billion), United States (fourth largest, US$1.03 
billion) and Japan (fifth largest, US$861.8 billion) 
(Lowy Institute 2018b). 
Chinese aid to the Pacific is given in the form 
of grants, interest free loans and concessional loans. 
Grants are allocated by China annually to the eight 
Pacific partner countries when they sign economic 
and technical cooperation agreements. Concessional 
loans are usually announced as outcomes of high-level 
visits. Japan delivers aid to the region in the forms of 
grants (grant aid and technical cooperation) and loan 
aid. Indian aid consists of grants, loan-based aid, lines 
of credit and training scholarships. The difference 
between India’s second and the third form of aid is 
that loan-based aid is administered by its Ministry 
of External Affairs and disbursed to support large 
infrastructure projects attached with grant-based aid, 
while lines of credit are managed by the Indian Export-
Import Bank for the purpose of supporting India’s 
export of goods, services and equipment. 
China has drastically increased its aid, especially 
concessional loans, to the Pacific. During Premier Wen 
Jiabao’s visit in Fiji in 2006, the major commitment 
was US$474 million (RMB 3 billion) in concessional 
loans to China’s eight partner countries over the next 
three years (Zhang 2017:46). Consequently, a number 
of infrastructure projects were funded by this loan 
facility such as the rebuilding of central business 
district (US$69.5 million, or RMB 440 million) in 
Nuku‘alofa, capital city of Tonga, after the old area was 
burnt down during a riot on 16 November 2006, and 
the construction of the University of Goroka dormitory 
(phase 2–4, US$46.4 million, or RMB 294 million)15 in 
PNG. Other aid commitments include: China would 
give zero-tariff treatment to the majority of exports to 
China from the least developed PICs16 that recognise 
China; write off these countries’ debts17 that became 
mature by 2005 and extend the other PICs’ debt 
payment by 10 years; donate anti-malaria medicine to 
the region; and provide 2000 opportunities of short-
term technical training for PICs (ibid.). 
China’s Vice Premier Wang Yang announced a new 
aid package to the region at the second conference 
of the China–Pacific Economic Development and 
Cooperation Forum held in Guangzhou in November 
2013. He revealed that the cumulative Chinese 
aid disbursements to the Pacific reached US$1.48 
billion (RMB 9.4 billion) between the 1970s and 
November 2013 (Zhang 2017:32). He pledged that 
the China Export-Import Bank would provide US$1 
billion in concessional loans to China’s eight partner 
countries in the region in the next four years along 
with US$1 billion in commercial loans from the 
China Development Bank to support infrastructure 
development; China would exempt tariffs on 95 per 
cent of imports from the least developed PICs and offer 
2000 scholarships for students from all 14 PICs18 to 
study at Chinese universities. To demonstrate China’s 
support of PICs in the area of climate change, this 
conference coincided with the China International 
Green Innovation Products and Technology Show and 
China committed more climate assistance to the region. 
As an example, China donated 1500 solar-powered 
streetlights to Tonga in December 2015. In November 
2014, Xi Jinping announced that China would reserve 
2000 scholarships and 5000 training slots for the 
region and grant zero tariffs for 97 per cent of exports 
to China from the least developed PICs (Zhang and 
Lawson 2017:199). 
Japan is an established traditional donor in the 
Pacific, though it has been overtaken by China in recent 
years. It fulfilled its aid commitments made at the 
triennial Pacific Leaders Meetings (PALM), including 
US$469 million (50 billion yen), US$500 million and 
US$515.8 million (up to 55 billion yen) at the 2009, 
2012 and 2015 summits respectively (Japan MOFA 
2009, 2012, 2015a). As a token of its greater attention on 
the Pacific, at PALM 8 in May 2018, Japan promised to 
reach out to more than 5000 Pacific Islanders through 
human resources development and people-to-people 
exchanges over the next three years (Japan MOFA 
2018). As Figure 3 illustrates, Japan provided a total of 
US$1,419.8 million of aid to the 14 PICs between 2006 
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and 2015, of which 89.3 per 
cent, or US$1,268 million, 
was distributed in grants 
and the remaining US$151.8 
million were concessional 
loans. PNG, Solomon 
Islands, Samoa and Fiji were 
the top four destinations of 
Japanese aid.
India is not a major 
donor in the Pacific and its 
aid is much less than that 
of China and Japan. As the 
Lowy Institute estimates, 
India committed a total of 
US$134.07 million in aid 
to PICs from 2011 onwards 
and US$32.25 million was 
disbursed (Lowy Institute 
2018b). Nonetheless, Indian 
aid to PICs has experienced a notable increase in 
the past decade. At the 2006 Pacific Island Forum 
meeting, India unveiled the ‘Pacific Island Country 
Assistance Initiative’ and pledged to offer a grant of 
US$100,000 annually to each of the 14 PICs, which 
was increased to US$125,000 in 2009. At the first 
summit of Forum for India Pacific Island Countries 
(FIPIC) in November 2014, Prime Minister Modi 
further increased Indian grant aid to US$200,000 for 
each PIC and pledged US$75 million in lines of credit 
to support Fiji’s sugar industry (India MEA 2014). 
India also increased its lines of credit to PNG. In April 
2016, Indian President Mukherjee visited PNG and 
announced that India would provide a US$100 million 
line of credit for infrastructure development in PNG 
(India MEA 29/4/2016). 
To make use of India’s expertise in areas such as IT, 
renewable energy and pharmaceutical manufacturing, 
India also announced a list of aid measures to support 
Pacific states in these areas (India MEA 2014, 2015a, 
2015b, 2017; see Appendix 1 for details). It also 
increased its aid to the implementation of sustainable 
development goals in the Pacific through the setting 
up of a US$100 million India–UN Development 
Partnership Fund and an additional US$50 million 
fund for Commonwealth countries (Paul 2018). 
Part 2. Motives
The activities of China, Japan and India in the 
Pacific are guided by their foreign policies towards 
the region and further analysis reveals a range of 
differing perspectives, yet a common goal. In China’s 
diplomatic jargon, the Pacific region is ‘a great 
periphery’ or extended neighbourhood in China’s 
diplomatic mapping (Zhang 2017:45).20 Beijing regards 
PICs as part of both China’s neighbourhood and the 
developing world that China needs to attend to. On 
the other hand, Japan has highlighted its solidarity 
with PICs, highlighting the importance of sharing 
the ocean and their common identities as ‘Islanders’ 
(Japan MOFA 2015b:158). India’s engagement with the 
Pacific is regarded by New Delhi as an extension of its 
‘Look East’ policy, which was proposed in the 1990s to 
strengthen India’s ties with South-East Asian countries. 
Similar to Japan, the Indian government highlights 
the Pacific bonding between India and PICs and their 
shared identity as maritime countries (India MEA 
2015a). Although the national interests of China, Japan 
and India in the Pacific cover a wide array of areas and 
the focuses vary, overall their diplomatic motives are 
more prominent than other considerations. 
Seeking PICs’ support at multilateral forums, 
especially the United Nations, is a primary motive of 
China, Japan and India. Although most PICs are small 
in land area and population, each of them (except 
Figure 3. Japan’s Official Development Assistance distribution to the Pacific, 2006–15, USD million.
Source: compiled by author using data from Japan’s ODA white papers.19
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Cook Islands and Niue who are not UN members) has 
an equal vote to other countries at the UN General 
Assembly.21 This appeals to China, Japan and India, 
who pursue mutually rewarding relationships with 
them. For China, the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty 
is extremely important and relevant to the Pacific. 
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) in 1949, it has been involved in a fierce 
diplomatic tug-of-war with Taiwan. In the past two 
years, Gambia (March 2016), Sao Tome and Principe 
(December 2016), Panama (June 2017), the Dominican 
Republic (May 2018), Burkina Faso (May 2018) and 
El Salvador (August 2018), former allies of Taiwan, 
established diplomatic relations with PRC, further 
squeezing Taiwan’s diplomatic space. To date, only 
16 states and the Holy See diplomatically recognise 
Taiwan. Six are from the Pacific: Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, 
Palau, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, making the region 
extremely important for both China and Taiwan. 
Japan and India have been persistent in seeking 
PICs’ support for their bid for permanent membership 
of the UN Security Council while China has lobbied 
strongly against Japan.22 At PALM 7 in May 2015, 
Japanese and Pacific leaders ‘reaffirmed the need to 
further strengthen the effectiveness and enhance the 
credibility of the UN Security Council, including 
through its expansion of both the permanent and 
non-permanent categories’ (Japan MOFA 2015a:12). 
As for India, Prime Minister Modi called for support 
from Pacific leaders at both the opening and closing 
ceremonies of the second summit of Forum for India 
Pacific Island Countries in August 2015, stating that 
‘We must press for reform in the United Nations 
Security Council … We seek your support for the text 
of the President of the General Assembly as a basis for 
reforming the Security Council’ (India MEA 2015a). 
All 14 PICs except Cook Islands and Niue pledged 
their support for India to be a permanent member 
of a reformed UN Security Council (Chandramohan 
13/6/2018). In exchange, India voiced support for a 
dedicated seat for Small Islands Developing States in 
an expanded UN Security Council (India MEA 2015a). 
In April 2016, PNG Governor General Michael Ogio 
assured visiting Indian President Mukherjee that PNG 
would support India’s bid. 
Japan has also lobbied PICs for support of its 
scientific whaling program, which is decried by anti-
whaling nations as a cover for commercial whaling. 
Among the 88 member states of the International 
Whaling Commission (IWC), six are PICs, including 
Kiribati, RMI, Nauru, Palau,23 Solomon Islands and 
Tuvalu. Some of these PICs have lent support to Japan’s 
proposal to resume commercial whaling, such as at 
the 2005 IWC meeting in Ulsan, which invited heavy 
criticism from Australia and New Zealand (Stringer 
2006:568–69). 
Economic interest is the second most significant 
motive of China and Japan in the Pacific. The extractive 
industries are a main focus. With an investment of 
US$1.4 billion, China Metallurgical Group Corporation 
is the largest stakeholder (61 per cent) of the Ramu 
Nickel mine in PNG. This is China’s largest single 
investment project in the Pacific. Chinese companies 
are also tapping mineral resources in Fiji. In August 
2013, Zhongrun International Mining Company 
Limited from China’s Shandong province acquired 
a two-thirds stake in Vatukoula Gold Mines PLC in 
Fiji for US$40 million (Hannan and Firth 2015:869). 
PNG’s export of the bulk of its liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) to Japan and China, since May and December 
2014 respectively, has resulted in a big boost to their 
economic relations. Under the sales and purchase 
agreements signed in December 2009, the PNG LNG 
project24 will supply 2 million, 1.8 million and 1.5 
million tonnes of LNG per annum for 20 years to 
China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation,25 Tokyo 
Electric Power Company Limited and Osaka Gas 
respectively. In his interview with PNG’s Post-Courier 
in July 2014, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was 
straightforward about the issue of energy security in 
Japan–PNG relations, stating that ‘the government of 
Japan regards the LNG development project as one of 
the priority areas of our bilateral cooperation’ (Japan 
MOFA 2014).
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are the main 
Chinese players that have made rapid inroads into 
the Pacific in the last decade to seek commercial 
opportunities. Based on official data from China’s 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), as of 2016, 67 
Chinese companies were operating in the eight PICs 
that recognise China.26 About 47 are SOEs, accounting 
for 70 per cent of the total number of Chinese 
companies, and most of them focus on Fiji (24) and 
PNG (12), China’s main economic partners in the 
region, though they are also exploring opportunities in 
the other PICs. For instance, China Civil Engineering 
Construction Group has dominated Chinese aid 
projects in Tonga, where its Pacific headquarters are 
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located, and Cook Islands. In addition, China’s fishing 
fleet has been expanding in the Pacific Ocean. Among 
the 40 Chinese firms operating in Fiji, as reported 
by China MOFCOM, 15 are fishing companies. In 
particular, the China Overseas Fisheries Corporation 
has about 40 tuna longliners operating in the waters of 
Fiji, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu.
Securing access to fishery resources in the Pacific 
is another major economic motive of Japan, which is 
the world’s largest consumer of tuna (consuming about 
70 per cent of global bluefin tuna). Despite their small 
land area (with PNG as an exception), PICs have huge 
exclusive economic zones which supply nearly 60 per 
cent of the global tuna catch (World Bank 2016:7). 
This complementarity makes PICs a crucial partner 
of Japan in this sector. Japan, along with the European 
Union and the United States, is one of the three main 
export destinations of tuna from the Pacific and also 
the main destination for PICs’ export of sashimi-grade 
tuna products. In 2015, Japan imported US$246 million 
of tuna from the region (FFA 2017:15). In addition, 
the Japanese government has made consistent efforts 
to secure the access of Japanese fishing fleets to the 
Pacific Ocean for decades. This dates back to the 
start of Japanese aid to the Pacific in the 1970s when 
PICs were a main recipient of Japan’s fisheries grants 
(Tarte 2008:134–35).
Compared with China and Japan, India’s economic 
presence in the Pacific is smaller, although India 
is starting to show more interest in the extractive 
industries in PNG. India has a stronger historical 
link with Fiji than China and Japan, which stands 
out as a significant motive for India to forge a closer 
partnership with Fiji. This dates back to 1879 when 
Indian labourers were brought in to work on sugarcane 
plantations. After successive coups, Indian-Fijians 
are a much smaller percentage of the overall Fijian 
population than they were at independence, a time they 
constituted a numerical majority. Nevertheless, based 
on the 2009 census,27 the number of Indian-Fijians 
was 313,798, which still accounts for one third of Fiji’s 
population. In April 2016, Indian President Mukherjee 
expressed his country’s interest in exploring LNG 
and other resources in PNG. PNG hosts the second 
largest Indian community in the Pacific. As of January 
2013, about 3000 Indian nationals resided in PNG. 
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates that the 
combined number of Chinese passport holders and 
Pacific Islanders of Chinese ethnicity is 20,911 in the 
eight PICs that have diplomatic relations with China, 
and most reside in PNG (10,000), Fiji (8000) and Tonga 
(2000).28 In total, 1526 Japanese nationals live in PICs, 
especially Fiji (464), Palau (370), PNG (205) and the 
FSM (122) (Japan MOFA 9/4/2018).
In addition to the diplomatic, economic and 
historical links, Chinese activity in the Pacific region 
is a notable element in Japan’s and India’s Pacific 
diplomacy. From a strategic perspective, China’s fast-
growing presence in the Pacific has forced Japan and 
India, who are China’s competitors on many fronts, to 
put more diplomatic resources in the region to counter 
China’s influence. Sandra Tarte, specialising in Japan–
Pacific relations, suggests that Japan’s growing aid 
commitments at triennial PALM summits are largely 
influenced by China’s growing presence in the region 
(2008:143). Japan’s Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) policy for PNG stated, ‘Japanese presence in 
PNG seems to have been somewhat comparatively 
lower while newly emerging donors become more 
influential to PNG’ (Japanese Embassy in PNG 
2012:1), which implicitly refers to China’s expanding 
aid program in PNG. In the context of escalating 
territorial disputes between China and neighbouring 
countries in the South and East China Seas, Japan 
has approached PICs for support of its position. At 
the sixth PALM summit in 2012, leaders from Japan 
and Pacific states underlined the importance of 
maintaining maritime order in the Pacific Ocean in 
line with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (Japan MOFA 2012). 
At the seventh PALM summit in 2015, in addition 
to reaffirming the position that maritime order 
should be maintained in accordance with universally 
recognised principles of international law, Japan 
and Pacific leaders underscored the importance of 
exercising self-restraint and peacefully resolving 
maritime disputes without resorting to the threat or use 
of force (Japan MOFA 2015a), which carries implicit 
criticism of China’s assertive activities in the South 
and East China Seas. At the eighth summit that ended 
in May in 2018, Japan and PICs also called for more 
transparency in China-funded large-scale infrastructure 
projects, stating that these projects should be developed 
‘in an open, transparent, non-exclusive and sustainable 
manner, in accordance with international standards, 
which also respect sovereignty and peaceful use of such 
infrastructure’ (Hurst 24/5/2018).
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China has attempted to secure diplomatic support 
from PICs for its position on its activities in the South 
China Sea, with PNG and Vanuatu expressing their 
(arguably, qualified) support (Zhang 2017:33). In May 
2016, the Vanuatu government issued a statement 
extending support of China’s position, for example that 
the disputes should be settled by those parties directly 
concerned and that historical and cultural facts should 
also be considered (Vanuatu Daily Post 26/5/2016). 
During PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neill’s visit to 
China in June 2016, the two governments issued a 
joint press release, in which it was stated that the PNG 
government ‘respects China’s principled position’ on the 
maritime disputes (China MFA 2016). However, both 
Vanuatu and PNG also insist that maritime disputes 
should be resolved peacefully and in accordance with 
international laws (Vanuatu Daily Post 26/5/2016; 
China MFA 2016). 
China’s activity also affects India’s engagement with 
the region. In November 2014, both Chinese President 
Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi paid official visits 
to Fiji and met with Pacific island leaders. India also 
included anti-terrorism in the discussions with PNG 
during President Mukherjee’s state visit in 2016. PNG 
extended support for India’s position and called on ‘all 
states to reject the use of terrorism as an instrument 
of state policy’ (India MEA 29/4/2016). This is an 
implicit reference to the intrusion of Pakistan-based 
military groups into India, and India’s criticism of 
China’s diplomatic support for Pakistan. This Chinese 
support had blocked India’s bids to add these military 
groups into the UN sanctions list (Panda 25/6/2015). 
In his interview with PNG’s Post-Courier, President 
Mukherjee stated that ‘all sea-lanes of communications 
should be free of tension and rivalry’ (Kenneth 
2/5/2016), which can be interpreted as India’s concerns 
about the territorial tensions in the South China Sea. 
China and India are also seeking PICs’ support on 
domestic issues. For instance, President Xi Jinping, who 
regards anti-corruption as one of his main political 
tasks, lauded Fiji’s efforts in chasing corrupt Chinese 
officials hiding in Fiji when he met with Prime Minister 
Bainimarama in November 2014 (Zhang and Lawson 
2017:44). India has obtained support from Fiji in its 
space program. In November 2013, India stationed 
two ships in Fiji’s territorial waters to monitor its Mars 
Orbiter mission, which was acknowledged by Prime 
Minister Modi during his visit in Fiji in November 
2014. He also expressed India’s willingness to assist 
PICs in establishing a space technology applications 
centre in the region and providing training support 
(India MEA 2015a). 
Part 3: Implications
This section will analyse the impact of China, Japan 
and India on the Pacific in the three areas of political 
relations, trade and aid, which echoes earlier discussion 
in the paper. Overall, the involvement of China, Japan 
and India in Pacific local politics is limited compared to 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Australia 
has a strong presence in the Pacific region, especially 
in Melanesia countries such as PNG, Solomon Islands 
and Vanuatu. New Zealand enjoys close historical, 
cultural and economic relations with Polynesian 
countries and has constitutional obligations with Cook 
Islands, Niue and Tokelau. For the United States, it is 
in compacts of free association with three Micronesian 
states: RMI, FSM and Palau.29 These traditional powers 
have also demonstrated their readiness to safeguard 
democracy and human rights30 in the region, which is a 
testimony to their deep involvement in regional politics. 
After the military coup in Fiji in 2006, for instance, 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States led 
international sanctions on the interim government until 
a parliamentary election was held in September 2014. 
In contrast, China, Japan and India, China in particular, 
have tried to circumvent the issues of democracy and 
human rights when they deliver aid to the region, on 
the grounds of non-interference in PICs’ internal affairs. 
Despite this commonality, a comparison of remarks 
from the governments of China, Japan and India shows 
differences in their approaches to the 2006 coup in 
Fiji (see text box below). Japan and India called on 
Fiji to restore democracy at the earliest opportunity, 
which was in line with the positions of Australia, New 
Zealand, the United States and the other Pacific island 
states. China’s statement is milder and ambiguous and 
avoids any wording of democracy. This can better be 
explained by Xi Jinping’s remarks when he met with 
Fijian Foreign Minister Ratu Inoke Kubuabola and 
Prime Minister Bainimarama in Beijing in October 
2010 (as China’s vice president) and May 2013 (as 
president). He said, ‘China respects the development 
path chosen by Fijian people … and will continue 
to provide assistance to Fiji within China’s capacity’ 
(Hao 15/10/2010:1; Zhao 30/5/2013:1). The irony is, 
of course, the people’s lack of choice when power has 
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been obtained militarily — and that Beijing supports 
the Bainimarama regime despite this fact. In February 
2009, Xi also ignored the diplomatic protests from 
Australia and New Zealand and paid a stopover visit to 
Fiji as vice president (Zhang 2017:47).
China and the eight Pacific partner countries 
established a ‘strategic relationship’ during Xi Jinping’s 
visit to Fiji in November 2014. Although this term 
bears a strong strategic and military flavour in 
international relations, it has been loosely used by 
the Chinese government to demonstrate its greater 
attention on relations with partner countries and has 
less of a military connotation (Zhang 2017:32). 
The key to understanding the strategy of China’s 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in dealing with 
PICs is understanding the ‘three island chains’ concept. 
It was originally an American strategic concept, but 
adopted by PLAN in 1982 as follows: 
In the first stage, from 2000 to 2010, China was to 
establish control of waters within the first island 
chain that links Okinawa Prefecture, Taiwan and 
the Philippines. In the second stage, from 2010 
to 2020, China would seek to establish control of 
waters within the second island chain that links 
the Ogasawara island chain, Guam and Indonesia. 
The final stage, from 2020 until 2040, China 
would put an end to U.S. military dominance 
in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, using aircraft 
carriers as a key component of their military 
force. (Pedrozo 2010:2)
PLAN is concentrating on the South China Sea, but 
more routinely moving beyond the first island chain. 
In December 2016, PLAN deployed China’s Liaoning 
aircraft carrier beyond the first island chain for the 
first time (Huang 19/5/2017). However, PLAN is still a 
long way from directly challenging the United States in 
the second island chain. As a result, to develop a deep 
military relationship with PICs is not seen as an urgent 
task for PLAN at present but in the future.31 Currently 
China’s military engagement with the Pacific is limited 
to providing scholarships, donating uniforms and non-
combat equipment, and visits by PLAN medical ships. 
When PLAN becomes more confident in the future 
and seeks to break free of the second island chain, it is 
likely that China will substantially increase the scope 
and depth of its military engagement with PICs and 
give a more ‘strategic’ meaning to the China–PICs 
strategic relations. 
The revitalisation of diplomatic competition 
between mainland China and Taiwan will have 
considerable impact on the region. The two sides 
have started to seek more diplomatic support from 
PICs. In May 2017, Fiji closed its trade and tourism 
representative office in Taipei, which served as Fiji’s 
de facto embassy in Taiwan (Radio New Zealand 
19/5/2017). This coincided with Prime Minister 
Bainimarama’s participation in the Belt and Road 
Forum in Beijing. In his public address at the Australian 
National University in June 2018, the Solomon Islands 
Prime Minister Rick Houenipwela, who had just 
concluded his first official visit to Taiwan in May, 
revealed that Taiwan is doing its best to consolidate 
diplomatic relations with Pacific partner countries. 
Official remarks on the military coup in Fiji
Japan is deeply concerned that on December 5, 
the situation in the Republic of the Fiji Islands 
came to the point that the national military forces 
headed by Commander Bainimarama took over the 
country’s executive authority and announced that 
they would establish an interim administration. 
Japan strongly hopes to see the situation 
normalized and the democratic political system 
restored promptly. (Japan MOFA 2006)
Mr Taro Aso, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
6 December 2006
We are saddened to learn about the turn of events 
in Fiji and hope that the rule of law will prevail and 
power will be returned to the people at the earliest. 
India greatly values its relations with Republic of 
Fiji Islands, a country with which we share cultural 
and historical links. (India MEA 2006)
Spokesperson of Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 
5 December 2006
We are concerned about the situation in Fiji. We 
hope that all parties in Fiji can work together and 
find a way to solve the issue. As a friend of Fiji, we 
sincerely hope that Fiji can maintain social stability, 
economic development and Fijian people can live 
in peace. This will be in the interest of Fiji and 
other countries in the region. (China MFA 2006) 
Qin Gang, spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 7 December 2006
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As Table 1 above shows, China has forged close 
economic ties with Solomon Islands, RMI, Kiribati and 
Nauru although they recognise Taiwan. What deserves 
special attention is the strong economic relationship 
between China and Solomon Islands. In 2016, China 
was Solomon Islands’ largest export destination and 
third largest source of imports, representing 62.5 per 
cent and 14.8 per cent of the latter’s export and import. 
Wood, articles of wood and charcoal accounted for 
96.8 per cent of China’s import from Solomon Islands 
in 2016 with a value of US$364.5 million (Pacific 
Trade and Investment 2017). Strong economic linkage 
appears to pave the way for a probable diplomatic 
breakthrough, as Gordon Lilo, then prime minister of 
Solomon Islands and his successor Manasseh Sogavare 
stated publicly in May 2013 and December 2014 
(Zhang 2017:38). They acknowledge that China’s rise 
needs to be factored into Solomon Islands’ trade and 
foreign relations (ibid.). In June 2018, a delegation 
of Solomon Islands government officials and lawyers 
visited China to seek assistance in exploring resources 
in Solomon Islands. Although Andrew Lee, spokesman 
of Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, downplayed the 
visit as a private trip and a trip that was not authorised 
by the Solomon Islands cabinet, he admitted the visit 
sent out a negative sign and the Taiwan government 
needs to take it seriously (Hou and Huang 16/6/2018). 
It is expected that China will continue to play the 
economic card to consolidate diplomatic relations 
with its eight Pacific partner states and forge closer 
partnerships with some of the six Pacific states that 
recognise Taiwan. As China’s diplomatic jargon puts it, 
this is yi jing cu zheng, or using economic benefits to 
promote better political relations between China and 
partner countries (Zhang and Smith 2017:2335).
While PICs now have more choices and their 
diplomatic stocks are rising as geostrategic competition 
intensifies in the region, they are also increasingly 
caught up in big power politics. For instance, they 
have been involved in the lobbies of China, Japan and 
India on issues of UN Security Council reform and the 
South China Sea disputes. As China has contradictory 
positions with that of Japan (and less so for India), this 
puts PICs in difficult situations as they cannot afford to 
offend any of the global powers and principal donors in 
the region. 
In the economic arena, increasing engagement 
with China, Japan and India provides opportunities for 
PICs. The huge markets in the three Asian countries, 
if used well, can absorb a large proportion of PICs’ 
exports. However, turning the potential into realities 
is not an easy task. From PICs’ perspective, the small 
size of their economies reduces the competitiveness of 
their exports. Processing capacity constraints also limit 
added value of their exports. China will host its first 
International Import Expo in Shanghai in November 
2018 and has extended invitation to PICs, which could 
make use of this opportunity to promote their exports 
to China. Japan and PICs also need to tap into trade 
opportunities such as making use of the Japan–PNG 
bilateral investment agreement that entered into force in 
January 2014. Bilateral trade between India and PICs is 
still low and has potential for growth. In August 2015, 
the Indian government announced the establishment of 
the Forum of India Pacific Island Countries Trade Office 
in the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry in New Delhi. Supporting the operation of this 
office will promote trade and investment between India 
and the Pacific region. 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative deserves some 
elaboration. The initiative is regarded by the Xi Jinping 
administration as its future legacy and therefore it is 
devoting substantial efforts to its implementation. Back 
in November 2014, Xi extended invitations welcoming 
PICs to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative 
(Zhang 2017). However, China is mainly rolling out 
this program in Asian countries and focusing on 
large-scale infrastructure projects. For most PICs, the 
demand for and affordability of this type of project is 
small.32 David Morris, Director of Pacific Trade and 
Investment in China, expressed a similar view, arguing 
that it is unlikely that China will be able to implement 
large-scale infrastructure projects in small PICs as part 
of the Belt and Road Initiative (Zhang 2018).
Given the economic vulnerability of most PICs and 
their reliance (though the degree varies) on foreign 
aid, the availability of financing resources from China, 
Japan and India provides new options for them. As 
traditional regional powers such as Australia and 
New Zealand provide grant aid and focus less on 
infrastructure projects, concessional loans from China, 
Japan and India have the potential to fill the gap. For 
instance, China’s lavish aid programs, supported by 
its practice of attaching no political strings in areas 
of human rights, democracy and good governance in 
recipient countries, have won much support in the 
Pacific.33 China, Japan and India have also increased 
their support to PICs in the battle against climate 
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change. In May 2015, Japan contributed US$1.5 billion 
to the global Green Climate Fund, which will benefit 
developing countries, especially small island developing 
states and least developed countries. In September 
2015, China pledged to establish a US$3.16 billion 
(RMB 20 billion) South-South Cooperation Climate 
Change Fund to support developing countries in this 
regard. India has sought to maximise the impact of its 
relatively small aid budget to the Pacific by focusing on 
areas of its comparative advantages, including climate 
change, information technology, renewable energy and 
ocean research (India MEA 2014; 2015b). This could 
strengthen PICs’ capacity in climate adaptation.
On the other hand, traditional regional powers have 
heightened concerns about China’s growing impact 
in their backyard associated with its fast-growing aid 
spending. Some of China’s aid practices have invited 
criticisms from regional powers and some officials in 
PICs. For example, China’s aid increase to the military 
regime in Fiji between 2006 and 2014 compromised 
the effect of traditional donors’ sanctions to press Fiji 
to return to democracy. Among the issues of major 
concern about Chinese aid in the Pacific are: the bulk 
of Chinese aid being concessional loans; tied aid (using 
a large proportion of building materials, equipment 
and workers from China in Chinese concessional 
loan projects); the scale of indebtedness of recipient 
countries, especially small PICs; weak environmental 
regulations; and lack of aid coordination.34 Although 
Japan and India provide similar loans to the region, 
the magnitude and fast growth of Chinese loans have 
attracted most of the attention and criticism. 
In a broader context, the growing presence of 
China, Japan and India accentuates the dynamics of 
geopolitical change in the Pacific region. Pacific island 
states have more choices but face the challenge of 
balancing their allegiances between traditional and 
new powers. External players — especially China and 
its growing influence in the Pacific — will further fuel 
policy debates in the United States, Australia and New 
Zealand. The Trump administration is adopting a hard-
line policy towards China. As the US National Security 
Strategy concludes, the United States’s engagement 
with rivals [China] in the past two decades, ‘based 
on the assumption that engagement with rivals and 
their inclusion in international institutions and global 
commerce would turn them into benign actors and 
trustworthy partners’, has failed (White House 2017:3). 
Two recent reports produced by the US Congress also 
expressed concerns that China’s rise in the Pacific could 
erode the US relations with Compact Micronesian 
countries and threaten US defence interests in the 
region (Lum and Vaughn 2017:13-16; Meick, Ker 
and Chan 2018:17-19). As the US government is 
implementing its Indo-Pacific policy to increase its 
presence in the region (Wong 2018) and viewing 
China as a main competitor, it is not surprising that 
the United States will make more efforts to counter 
China’s influence in the Pacific. Similarly, in recent 
years, policymakers in Australia and New Zealand have 
been increasingly alerted to China’s rise in the Pacific. 
The two regional powers have pledged to consolidate 
their influence in the Island countries. Therefore, 
competition between Australia, New Zealand and 
China in the region could also become more prominent 
in the future. 
Conclusion
The relevance of the Pacific Islands in the external 
relations of China, India and Japan is an under-
researched theme in the literature. By focusing on the 
three areas of political engagement, trade and aid, this 
Discussion Paper has examined these Asian powers’ 
latest engagement with PICs between 2006 and 2017, 
their motives and the impact on the region. The paper 
argues that all the three countries have substantially 
increased their activities in the region but that the 
extent is different. In terms of bilateral high-level visits, 
an important indicator of political relations, China has 
shown the most activity, followed by Japan and then 
India. Japan and China have set up more embassies in 
the Pacific than India. China’s trade with the 14 PICs 
exceeds the combined trade volume of Japan and India 
with the region, and India is well behind China and 
Japan. China and Japan are among the top five donors 
in the Pacific. By contrast, India is not a main donor 
but it is increasing its aid budget for the region. 
With respect to motives, China has invested much 
to win PICs’ support for the ‘One China’ policy against 
Taiwan. China, Japan and India have lobbied PICs for 
voting support at multilateral organisations, especially 
the United Nations. Securing access to mineral, energy 
and fishery resources in the region is an important 
factor for China and Japan, both having a stake in these 
industries, while India is starting to show interest. 
Importantly, the activities of China in the Pacific region 
have had a noticeable impact on Japan and India’s 
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diplomacy in the region. This paper reveals that the 
growing presence of all three Asian powers is having 
a mixed impact on the Pacific region, providing new 
options for PICs to benefit from stronger economic and 
aid relations. At the same time, PICs are increasingly 
caught up in big power politics. The rise of external 
players — especially China — is fuelling geostrategic 
competition in the region.
While enriching the debates on Asian presence 
in the Pacific, this paper reveals areas that need to 
be addressed in future studies. For instance, how 
have China, Japan and India engaged with PICs in 
other sectors such as public diplomacy and military 
cooperation? What are the attitudes of each PIC 
towards the growing presence of China, Japan and 
India in the region? How have different stakeholders, 
including the government, business, academics, civil 
society groups and the media responded to the growing 
presence of these Asian powers in their countries? 
These questions demand more research in the future. 
Endnotes
1. Fijian media reported in June 2018 that Fiji and China 
will complete the negotiation on Fiji’s membership of 
AIIB soon. Fiji Sun online, 11/6/2018, Fiji, China MOU 
‘Sealed Soon’.
2. One US dollar bought 106.63 Japanese yen and 6.33 
Chinese yuan (RMB) in February 2018. These rates are 
used in this paper.
3. Some data such as trade are still unavailable for 2017.
Meeting Aid pledges
1st summit of Forum for 
India and Pacific Islands 
Countries, November 2014
1. to increase Indian grant aid to US$200,000 for each PIC
2. US$70 million in line of credit for a co-generation power plant at Rarawai Sugar Mills
3. US$5 million in line of credit to upgrade Fiji’s sugar industry 
4. US$5 million in grant to develop villages and small/medium industries in Fiji
5. to set up a Special Adaptation Fund of US$1 million in support of PICs’ capacity 
building to address climate change
6. to dispatch Indian technical experts to PICs in the fields of agriculture, health and 
information technology
7. to set up a trade office in India and provide complimentary space to PICs during 
exhibitions organised by India
8. to provide training to PIC diplomats at India’s Foreign Services Institute
2nd Forum summit, August 
2015
1. to establish an institute for sustainable coastal and ocean research and a network of 
marine biology research stations in the Pacific
2. to allocate 110 Indian technical and economic cooperation training slots to Fiji and 
double the number of slots for other 13 PICs from 119 to 238
3. to provide 33 college education scholarships to Fiji and a new offer of two similar 
scholarships to each of the other 13 PICs
4. to expand training courses for PIC diplomats and offer a two-week business management 
course at the Indian Institute of Management in Bengaluru
5. to establish at least one IT laboratory in each PIC
6. to train 70 women solar engineers from the Pacific
7. to provide 200 houses with solar electrification in each of the 14 PICs
8. to offer a line of credit to set up a pharmaceutical manufacturing plant and distribution 
centre in the Pacific and supply generic drugs at low cost to the region
1st India–Pacific Islands 
Sustainable Development 
Conference, May 2017
1. to donate US$1 million to support Fiji’s presidency of the 23rd Conference of the Parties 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in November 2017
2. to gift programmatic content on India for telecast to all the 14 PICs
Appendix 1: Indian’s recent aid pledges to the Pacific region
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4. Raw data are drawn from the websites of China’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
India’s Ministry of External Affairs and their diplomatic 
missions in the Pacific. The figures include official/
working/private visits, visits of special envoys and 
attendance of conferences and events. Some outdated 
data from the websites have been manually checked and 
triangulated with other sources to maximise accuracy.
5. China–PNG relations deserve clarification. PNG 
newspaper The National reported that Prime Minister 
Peter O’Neill said, during his visit to China in June 
2018, that the two countries agreed to established a 
comprehensive strategic partnership. This information is 
inaccurate as the Chinese official media and MFA release 
only stated that China is willing to work with PNG to 
push bilateral relations to a new level.
6. The source is the websites of Chinese embassies in the six 
Pacific states.
7. These figures are close to China MFA’s records that China 
exported US$3.974 billion in goods to RMI, accounting 
for 74.6 per cent of China’s total export of US$5.32 billion 
to the 14 PICs.
8. RMI overtook Liberia as the world’s second largest ship 
registry in deadweight tonnage terms in March 2017, 
second only to Panama.
9. More on China–RMI trade can be found in the book 
chapter, ‘Er shi yi shiji yilai zhongguo yu nantai daoguo 
maoyi bu pinghengxing yanjiu’ [Trade imbalance between 
China and South Pacific Island Countries in the 21st 
Century]. (Pang and Ye 2015).
10. World Bank, WITS: Product Exports by China to 
Marshall Islands 2016.
11. When comprehending these trading figures, it is worth 
bearing in mind the special feature of China–RMI trade 
as discussed in the text. However, even after excluding 
RMI, China’s export to the other 13 PICs had grown 
steadily between 2007 and 2016 except for 2010.
12. World Bank, WITS: Trade Statistics by Country/Region. 
The World Bank data is used here because data is 
unavailable from open resources in China, Japan and India.
13. For example, the Pacific aid map released by the Lowy 
Institute in August 2018 suggested there is an enormous 
gap between aid commitments and disbursements, 
particularly in the case of China.
14. According to World Bank data, based on China’s official 
poverty line (net income of RMB 2300 per capita per year, 
equivalent to US$1 dollar per day), in 2015 there were 55 
million people living in poverty in China. The number would 
be much higher if the international poverty line (US$1.9 
per day per capita), lower middle income class poverty line 
(US$3.2 per day per capita) or upper middle income class 
poverty line (US$5.5 per day per capita) is applied. See World 
Bank, The World Bank in China: Overview.
15. This is China’s first concessional loan project in PNG.
16. Least developed PICs include Kiribati, Solomon Islands, 
Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Among them, Vanuatu has 
diplomatic relations with China.
17. This refers to interest-free loans.
18. There are two main types of Chinese government 
scholarships. The first is provided bilaterally to students 
from China’s eight partner countries. The other is 
channelled through the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
and open to all 14 PICs.
19. Japan MOFA, White Paper on Development Cooperation 
/ Japan’s ODA White Paper.
20.  The complete expressions are: ‘big powers are the 
key (daguo shi guanjian); peripheral countries are the 
priority (zhoubian shi shouyao); developing countries 
are the foundation (fazhanzhong guojia shi jichu); 
multilateral platforms are the important stage (duobian 
shi zhongyao wutai)’.
21. Except for Cook Islands and Niue, both being associated 
states of New Zealand and recognised by the UN as 
non-UN member states.
22. In October 2016, Sun Yuxi, former Chinese ambassador 
to India, told the Indian media that China opposes Japan’s 
rather than India’s bid for permanent membership of the 
UN Security Council. Phoenix New Media.
23. In June 2010, Palau announced it would end support for 
Japan’s commercial whaling proposal. This decision is 
largely related to Palau’s declaration as being the world’s 
first shark sanctuary in September 2009.
24. A fourth main purchaser is Chinese Petroleum 
Corporation Taiwan, under contract to purchase 1.2 
million tonnes of PNG LNG per annum for 20 years.
25. The imported LNG will supply Shandong, China’s second 
most populous province with 100 million people27.
26. The source of this raw data is China FMA.
27. Ethnicity was not reported in the 2017 census in Fiji as 
there was no reliable collection of data on ethnicity. See 
Fiji Bureau of Statistics, Statement on Ethnicity, 5/3/2018.
28. China FMA.
29. Under the compact, the United States provides guaranteed 
assistance and defence to these countries. In return, it is 
allowed to operate armed forces in these countries while 
other countries cannot without US permission.
30. There are notable exceptions, such as human rights abuses 
in West Papua and the rule of law in Nauru. Thank you to 
an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm16                                                                                                                             Department of Pacific Affairs
Denghua Zhang
31. For more on island chain theories, see works such as 
Kaplan 2010; Erickson and Wuthnow 2016.
32. Author’s interviews with Chinese aid official and SOE 
representative, Canberra, July 2016.
33. Author’s interviews with officials and scholars in PNG 
and Samoa, Port Moresby and Apia, November 2014–
February 2015.
34. Japan has been involved in more aid coordination in the 
Pacific than China. For instance, Japan has supported 
the Cairns Compact on Strengthening Development 
Coordination in the Pacific while China has not.
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